The notion of interaction and interaction machines, developed by Peter Wegner, includes the comparison between incompleteness of interaction machines and Gödel incompleteness. However, this comparison is not adequate, because it combines different notions and different sources of incompleteness. In particular, it merges syntactic with two senses of semantic completeness, and results about truth (Tarski) with results about provability and their consequences (Gödel). The comparison also overlooks structural differences in the way diagonalization produces incompleteness. More generally, the comparison is unlikely because interaction incompleteness is supposed to come from a system's involvement with its environment, whereas Gödel incompleteness comes from a system's involvement with itself.
Introduction
In a series of papers, notably in [15] and [16] , Peter Wegner has championed the paradigm of interaction (symbolic interaction). He typically begins by observing that interaction is not expressible by a finite initial input string [16, p. 315] , and then introduces what he calls interaction machines, which extend Turing machines by adding dynamic input/output (read/write) actions that interact directly with an external environment [16, p. 316 , definition 1].
Instead of 'finite initial input strings', these machines are supposed to have dynamically generated input streams, 'mathematically modeled by infinite sequences' [15, p. 89] . This characterization is the basis for what Wegner calls incompleteness of interaction machines, the most precise sense of which is that 'the set of computations of an interaction machine cannot be enumerated' [15, p. 89] . Wegner compares interaction incompleteness in this sense with Gödel's incompleteness result for formal arithmetic:
Gödel's discovery that the integers cannot be described completely through logic [. . . ] may be adapted to show that interaction machines cannot be completely described by first-order logic [15, p. 83 ].
This comparison has been previously examined by Ekdahl [3] , who showed that it depends on confusing two different senses of completeness, and pointed out a certain contradiction in Wegner's treatment of completeness [3, p. 4] . The present note amplifies Ekdahl's conclusions by adding a third sense of completeness, present in Wegner's comparison. The main addition of the note to what Ekdahl has already noticed is the finding that the comparison between interaction incompleteness and Gödel incompleteness is also inadequate at the level of the sources of these sorts of incompleteness. Even before looking closer into them, it may be noted that the comparison seems strange, because interaction incompleteness is supposed to come from a system's involvement with its environment, whereas Gödel incompleteness comes from a system's involvement with itself.
The note first revisits briefly the incompleteness ambiguity noted by Ekdahl, as a way of introducing two basic concepts of completeness (section 2.1), and then points out a further, third sense of completeness in Wegner's comparison (section 2.2). Next, moving to the level of the sources of incompleteness (section 3), the note shows that Wegner does not present correctly the way in which Gödel incompleteness is obtained (section 3.1). The most detailed argument of the note, close to the actual technical level invoked in the comparison, then points out inadequacies in Wegner's treatment of the role of the specific mechanism of incompleteness (diagonalization) in his concept of interaction incompleteness (section 3.2.1) and its supposed connection with Gödel incompleteness (section 3.2.2). The discussion that follows (section 4) returns to more general questions about interaction, computation and incompleteness, attempting to address the intuitions which might have motivated Wegner's comparison.
Senses of completeness
One reason for the inadequacy of the comparison between interaction incompleteness and Gödel incompleteness is that, in the treatment of Gödel incompleteness, it conflates various senses of completeness. Ekdahl [3] has already noted two of them, which will be revisited here, using different textual examples, as a way of refreshing two basic concepts of completeness before drawing attention to a third one.
Semantic and syntactic completeness
In one of his more representative publications [16] [16, p. 344] . However, the sense of completeness in which Gödel proved incompleteness is different from the completeness which Wegner refers to. The completeness in his definition is basically a relation between a theory and what it can be about; more precisely, it is a property of the theory whose definition involves the interpretations of the theory, which is why it is called semantic completeness. By contrast, the completeness in Gödel's incompleteness result is a property of the theory alone, namely the provability or refutability of any statement (syntactic completeness). Moreover, and somewhat ironically, not only did Gödel not prove incompleteness in Wegner's sense, but he proved completeness in that sense [8, p. 67] . That is, Gödel did not prove what Wegner's statement implies, namely that some formulae true in all interpretations are not provable (semantic incompleteness); on the contrary, he proved that all such formulae are provable (semantic completeness). Gödel also proved, quite independently, that some statements are neither provable nor refutable in a sufficiently consistent system of arithmetic, and related theories (syntactic incompleteness), but that is a very different story. It might be added that this 'misunderstanding of the completeness and incompleteness results' noted by Ekdahl [3, p. 4 ] is frequent enough, and that textbooks rarely bother to 'decrease the likelihood that the reader will assume that Gödel's incompleteness theorem has something to do with semantic completeness', as McCawley's does [7, pp. 74-6].
A third sense of completeness
A further, third sense of completeness, present in Wegner's comparison, completes the confusion about completeness noted by Ekdahl [3] . He also mentioned this sense of completeness as a third possibility, but it was not actually present in the paper he examined [16] . [15, p. 89] . Here, incompleteness is a property of the "integers" (natural numbers, more likely), not of a theory about them (or a logic). Disregarding this further sort of (in)completeness, the three basic senses of completeness between which Wegner moves concern
• the relation between provability and truth in all models (Gödel's completeness)
• the relation between provability and truth in a particular model • the provability or refutability of all statements (Gödel's incompleteness)
The confusion noted by Ekdahl involves the first and the third sense of completeness, while the additional confusion in the definition above involves the last two senses. The first sense of completeness is involved in Gödel's completeness result, which is related to logic; the third sense of completeness is involved in Gödel's incompleteness result, which is related to arithmetic.
Sources of incompleteness
The misunderstanding about the nature of Gödel incompleteness, presented above, is accompanied by a misunderstanding of the sources of incompleteness, both of Gödel incompleteness and interaction incompleteness. This misunderstanding, at the level of reasons for incompleteness, is central to the comparison between the two sorts of incompleteness, and is also interesting enough in itself to reconstruct in some detail.
Sources of Gödel incompleteness
Wegner says that if the logic is both sound and complete, [. . . ] the number of true assertions expressible by theorems is recursively enumerable [. . . ] Gödel proved incompleteness using a diagonalization argument to show that true statements were not recursively enumerable [16, p. 343-4] .
In order to understand and evaluate this passage, it is not actually necessary to know what "recursively enumerable" means, and what a diagonalization argument is. These will be explained when they come up again later, but what matters here is only the top structure of Wegner's statements. If the first one is abbreviated as sound and complete → truths are RE the second can be written as Gödel proved incompleteness using D to show that truths are not RE Wegner thus suggests that Gödel showed that the right-hand side of the implication above is false, so the left-hand side must be false too; assuming soundness (truth of theorems), this would indeed establish incompleteness. This interpretation of Wegner's idea of Gödel's proof is rather accommodating, because Wegner talks of 'the number of true assertions expressible by theorems', not the "number" (set, more likely) of true assertions. Thus, strictly speaking, the right-hand side of the implication above should be 'provable truths are RE', which does not need the condition provided by the implication. But the point is that even if Wegner's statements are sympathetically interpreted to constitute a valid argument, this argument does not present correctly Gödel's proof of incompleteness. Gödel did not prove incompleteness in the way suggested, in the first place because this would be the wrong, semantic sort of incompleteness. This can be seen if the first deleted part of the quotation above is restored:
if the logic is both sound and complete, then there is a one-to-one correspondence between syntactic theorems and semantically true assertions for all models, and the number of true assertions expressible by theorems is recursively enumerable [. . . ] (emphasis mine)
The part restored here was initially deleted in order to bring out Wegner's idea of the basic logical (propositional) structure of Gödel's proof. However, the sense of completeness present in this part (semantic completeness) is not appropriate for the whole passage, since Gödel proved a different sort of incompleteness. This was already explained in section 2, but what should be added here is that Gödel proved incompleteness independently of the implication above. Gödel proved incompleteness directly, by constructing a statement which is neither provable nor refutable in a (sufficiently) consistent system (of arithmetic).
Similar objections apply to an earlier, somewhat more precise version of the claim quoted above:
The set of true statements of a sound and complete logic can be enumerated as a set of theorems and is therefore recursively enumerable. Gödel showed incompleteness of the integers by showing that the set of true statements about integers was not recursively enumerable [15, p. 89 ].
The fact that truths about "integers" (natural numbers) are not recursively enumerable means that they cannot be listed using certain well-behaved combinations of simple ways of specifying things. Again, knowing precisely what these ways and combinations are is not necessary to understand and evaluate the claim that Gödel showed incompleteness of the integers by showing that truths about them are not enumerable in these ways and combinations. Incidentally, the previously quoted version of the claim shows that the claim itself is not an excessively literal reading of Wegner's statement. In any case, the fact that truths about "integers" are not enumerable in certain ways and combinations was not instrumental in Gödel's incompleteness proof. In that proof, Gödel actually avoided the concept of truth; as Feferman says, Gödel 'took pains to eliminate the concept of truth from the main results of 1931' [4, p. 106] (it is present only in his introductory sketch of these results, which will be used in the next section).
In his (first) incompleteness theorem, Gödel proved that a particular statement of arithmetic is not provable if the theory is consistent. He constructed this statement to be readable as a meta-theoretical statement too, saying precisely that about itself, namely that it is not provable. Assuming that arithmetic is consistent, the statement is true. This formulation is a little too simple (there are models of arithmetic in which the statement is false), but the point is that this is the path to the conclusion that some arithmetical truth is not a theorem. This conclusion can indeed also be reached in the way Wegner suggests:
Theorems are recursively enumerable Arithmetical truths are not recursively enumerable Therefore, some arithmetical truth is not a theorem However, this argument only establishes a consequence of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, not the theorem itself. Perhaps more importantly, not only does the argument fall short of establishing Gödel's incompleteness result, but it also goes the wrong way about it, so to speak. The reason is that the argument raises the question of its second premise: where did that premise come from? The result that truths about natural numbers are not recursively enumerable was actually established after Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and is better associated with Tarski. It follows from two other results: the fact that recursively enumerable sets are definable by arithmetical formulas [10, p. 126] , and the result that the set of true statements about natural numbers is not so definable [10, p. 122] , which is closely related to Tarski's result proper. Both express the idea that the property of being a true sentence of arithmetic is not expressible in it (Tarski's theorem says, roughly, that if arithmetic is consistent, it does not have a truth predicate). The error in Wegner's idea of the source of Gödel incompleteness is now clear, and can be restated briefly: the logical path goes, not from Wegner's pseudo-Tarski to Gödel, but from Gödel to Tarski (Tarski's theorem can be proved from Gödel's (first) incompleteness theorem, by way of two other theorems).
Diagonalization
Interestingly, Wegner's misunderstanding of the reasons for Gödel incompleteness is matched by a misunderstanding of the reasons for what he calls interaction incompleteness. To refresh the notions involved, interaction machines extend Turing machines by adding dynamic input/output (read/write) actions that interact directly with an external environment [16, p. 
Diagonalization in interaction incompleteness
Interaction machine incompleteness as non-enumerability of computations indeed follows from non-enumerability of infinite input sequences. What is more problematic is the claim that interaction incompleteness does not require diagonalization, because non-enumerability of infinite sequences seems to require it. That is, diagonalization is precisely the method used to prove that infinite sequences over a finite alphabet are not enumerable [2, p. 17] . This is established by taking the sequences of any proposed enumeration to be the rows of a matrix such as an alternative proof that infinite sequences over a finite alphabet are not enumerable. As a matter of fact, such proofs which do not use diagonalization can be constructed, for example by what might be called parabolization: the sequence which falls outside any given enumeration can be defined by taking its first element to be different from the first element of the first sequence, its fourth element different from the fourth element of the second sequence, its ninth element different from the ninth element of the third sequence, and so on. No matter how the intervening elements are chosen, the resulting sequence will differ from all the sequences in the enumeration: from sequence number i in element number i 2 . That is, instead of going down the diagonal of the matrix above, some other path such as a parabola can be taken. So, it should be conceded that "interaction machine incompleteness does not require diagonalization", even though alternative proofs are needlessly more complex, which is why they don't appear in the literature. However, what is more important is that the remark about diagonalization also holds for Gödel's incompleteness, to an even greater extent, so the remark looses its point.
Diagonalization and what was called parabolization use the same proof idea, namely the systematic construction of a sequence which differs from each of the enumerated sequences in a prescribed position, prescribed by a certain function (identity in the case of diagonalization, a quadratic function in the case of "parabolization"). On this basis, it might be said that diagonalization and "parabolization" are really the same thing, and should not be distinguished. However, this objection would provide no support for the claim that interaction machine incompleteness does not require diagonalization. On the contrary: the claim is true if diagonalization is understood in the usual, literal sense, referring to the diagonal in the matrix above. The case of "parabolization" supported the claim, and the objection would remove this support.
Diagonalization in Gödel incompleteness
In Gödel's introductory sketch of the incompleteness proof [5, pp. 7-8] , the starting point is the matrix of statements:
where P i (x) is the i-th property of natural numbers in some enumeration of such properties. If the diagonal procedure in the proof of non-enumerability of infinite sequences is described by the term
(abusing notation a little in order to bring out similarities), the procedure in Gödel's proof is described by the term
That is, non-provability of the statements along the diagonal in the matrix above defines a certain property of natural numbers: a number i has this property if the statement P i (i) is not provable. This property has a certain number g in the enumeration of properties, and the incompleteness result follows from considering what happens at the corresponding place on the diagonal, with the statement P g (g). This statement says that the number g has the property P g (x), which means that the statement P g (g) is unprovable, by the definition of that property. The statement P g (g) is thus the statement mentioned in the previous section, namely the statement that says of itself that it is not provable. A short reflection on the definition of P g (x) then shows that P g (g) is neither provable nor refutable; the interested reader can find this reflection in the appendix.
Comparing the two incompleteness proofs, it is obvious that there are major structural differences in their use of diagonalization. In the proof of non-enumerability of infinite sequences, a new sequence was constructed for any enumeration of sequences; in Gödel's proof, the property constructed from a given enumeration of properties is a special member of that enumeration. This goes directly against Wegner's and Goldin's claim that Gödel proved his theorem by showing that arithmetic over the integers could not be expressed by an enumerable number of formulae, using diagonalization to prove nonenumerability [18, p. 14] .
Another difference between the proofs is that the first one uses elements satisfying a certain property (that of being different from the diagonal element), whereas the second proof uses such a property itself (that of having an unprovable diagonal element). The first proof only walks down the diagonal to define a new row; the second proof walks down the diagonal to single out a certain row whose diagonal element is itself part of the walk. The term (3.1) describes a procedure, or the resulting new row of the matrix, at the meta-level, whereas (3.2) describes a special row, and does so in the same theory in which the other properties are formulated. This difference will be clearer if what it takes to describe the special row is indicated in some more detail:
This formula indicates the basic structure of the special property P g (x); the term subst(P i (x), num(i)) describes the result of substituting, into the i-th property P i (x), the numeral of its number i for the free variable. This procedure, whose description is part of P g (x), is then used on P g (x) itself to produce P g (g). This should make obvious the considerable difference between the proofs of interaction incompleteness and Gödel incompleteness: the first proof only performs a procedure, whereas the second formalizes a procedure and then applies it to its own formalization. The double use of diagonalization in Gödel's proof is a sophisticated elaboration of the use of diagonalization in interaction incompleteness, so it makes little sense to say that it can be "adapted" for such simple use. Finally, taking up again Wegner's remark that interaction incompleteness does not require diagonalization [15, p. 89] : the same applies to Gödel incompleteness, only more so, so to speak. That is, more variations that do not use diagonalization are possible in Gödel incompleteness, because of its greater complexity. First, diagonalization as the special substitution of the numeral of a formula's Gödel number "back" into the formula, in place of the free variable, can be replaced by some other substitution, corresponding to a different path through the rows of the matrix above, for example along lines parallel to the diagonal [1] , or along other paths that can be described in the formal system, such as the parabola in the interaction incompleteness example. The condition that the alternative path can be described in the formal system is necessary in order to replace the term subst(P i (x), num(i)), which describes the diagonal substitution in (3.2), with a description of the alternative path. A further variation that does not use diagonalization is the use of some other operation instead of substitution, such as concatenation [11] . Finally, it is also possible to eliminate diagonalization from the surface of the proof and push it down into its presupposition, namely into the system of numbering properties of natural numbers (non-standard or Kripke codes) [12, p. 628] . Such "pre-diagonalization" makes it possible to construct sentences that refer to themselves directly, through the numeral of their own number, instead of using operations such as substitution or concatenation.
Discussion
The claim that there is a connection between interaction incompleteness and Gödel incompleteness seems implausible even without going into the details of their proofs and the role of diagonalization in these proofs. The two kinds of incompleteness have basically different sources: Gödel incompleteness comes, so to speak, from a system's involvement with itself, not from involvement, 'interaction with an external environment', because it depends on reflecting the relation of provability for a system within the system itself. Simplifying considerably in order to address the intuition which might motivate Wegner's comparison, it could be said that interaction incompleteness is computation overwhelmed by input, whereas Gödel incompleteness is computation overwhelmed by becoming its own input. It might even be said that Gödel incompleteness comes from self-interaction, which would at least explain why Wegner calls diagonalization an interactive process [16, p. 318] . However, this would invert Wegner's statement of the relation between interaction incompleteness and Gödel incompleteness. If self-interaction is a form of interaction, it could only be the case that Gödel incompleteness is a form of interaction incompleteness, not the other way around. But saying this would amount to little more than stretching meanings in order to meet Wegner's intuitions and correct them. It is much better to say that the two forms of incompleteness are independent, and only share, in a general way, a certain method of proof.
More generally, interaction itself, human or otherwise, does not seem to have any feature of Gödel incompleteness, though some kinds of interaction might recall a Gödel-type situation. A conceivable sort of example might be social situations whose framework, not to say consistency, is defined by obvious but unspeakable or unutterable truth ("elephant in the room" or "naked emperor" phenomena). A likely place to look for better connections between interaction and Gödel incompleteness might be the field of pragmatic paradoxes ("paradoxical interaction") [13] .
If incompleteness is supposed to be the basic feature of interaction, 'the essential ingredient distinguishing interactive from algorithmic models of computing' [15, p. 88 ], this is not Gödel incompleteness. A better case can actually be made for connecting Gödel incompleteness not to interaction machines but to classical Turing machines. Webb [14] has indicated in some detail how Gödel incompleteness brings the richness of behavior and unpredictability, supposedly characteristic of interaction machines, to classical Turing machines [14, ch. IV, esp. p. 193] . Other aspects of the significance of Wegner's notion of interaction for the theory of computation have been examined elsewhere [9] , but what can be added here is that this significance is limited, in Wegner's own papers and in some collaborative efforts [18] , by the fact that the characterization of interaction machines mainly concerns the input side of computations. More precise implications for computational architectures servicing such input may be drawn in papers inspired by Wegner's emphasis on interaction [6] , but these papers don't suggest connections with Gödel's incompleteness.
A Appendix
The proof of Gödel incompleteness from the statement P g (g) in section 3.2.2 goes as follows: if the statement were provable, this would mean that the number g has the property P g (x), which would in turn mean that P g (g) would not be provable, by the definition of that property. Since the assumption that P g (g) is provable would thus lead to contradiction, the statement cannot be provable. On the other hand, if the statement P g (g) was refutable, this would mean that the number g does not have the property P g (x), which would in turn mean that P g (g) is provable, by the definition of that property; since the assumption that Pg(g) is refutable would lead to contradiction, it cannot be refutable either.
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